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NEW YORKERS COMMUTE MORE EVERYWHERE: CONTRAST EFFECTS IN
THE FIELD
Uri Simonsohn*
Abstract—Previous experimental research has shown that people’s decisions can be influenced by options they have encountered in the past. This
paper uses PSID data to study this phenomenon in the field, by observing
how long people commute after moving between cities. It is found, as
predicted, that (i) people choose longer commutes in a city they have just
moved to, the longer the average commute was in the city they came from,
and (ii) when they move again within the new city, they revise their
commute length, countering the effect their origin city had on their initial
decision.

I.

Introduction

I

s that more promising job worth commuting downtown
everyday? Does residing in a better school district compensate the discomfort of commuting 10 more minutes to
work? Does getting away from Manhattan’s high rents
justify the 45-minute train ride? To answer these questions,
people must trade off the utility of the benefits they obtain
by the longer commute, with the disutility of the extra
minutes spent traveling on a daily basis.
Based on what is known in psychology as contrast
effects—people’s perceptions and judgments being affected
by earlier experiences—this paper proposes that people
behave as if the disutility they derive from commuting is
influenced by commutes they have observed in the past. In
particular, the longer the average commute was in a city a
person moved from, the higher the willingness to endure
long commutes in the new city will be. This prediction
found support in a sample of intercity movers from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The most plausible alternative explanation for this finding
is that movers from cities with longer commutes have a
(stable) higher tolerance for commuting, either because they
self-selected into those cities based on their commuting
tolerance, or because they developed such tolerance after
commuting long distances in those cities.
The empirical section presents several tests showing that
unobserved stable heterogeneity in commuting tolerance
cannot fully account for the data. Perhaps the most important one of these results is that, consistent with contrast
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effects but not with stable unobserved differences, the effect
of the previous city quickly dissipates as people remain in
their new city. A more accurate title for this paper might be
“New Yorkers Commute More Everywhere—For a While.”
One interpretation for this paper’s findings is that people
acquire commuting capital not only by “consuming” long
commutes, as proposed by habit formation models, but also
merely by living in a city where people commute a lot.
In what follows, section II briefly reviews relevant literature, section III links such literature to the specific realm of
travel demand, section IV presents the empirical analysis,
and section V concludes.
II.

Background

Economists have, until very recently, typically left the
task of studying factors that systematically affect people’s
preferences to other social scientists. In recent years, however, there has been growing interest in incorporating psychology’s insights on preference formation into economics.
For example, Rabin (1993) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
discuss moderators of prosocial preferences, Laibson (2001)
the effects of environmental cues on preferences, Loewenstein (1996) the role of emotional arousal in self-control,
and Caplin and Leahy (2001) the importance of anticipatory
feelings; Koszegi and Rabin (2004), Tversky and Kahneman (1991), and Sugden (2003) introduce models of
reference-dependent preferences.
An interesting insight from psychology that has not yet
made its way into economics is what are referred to as
context effects, defined by McFadden (1999) as situations
where choices are affected by the setting in which alternatives are offered. Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982), for example, found that adding an extreme alternative to a choice set
can make other extreme, but not as extreme, alternatives
appear to be “compromise” options, increasing their market
share.
A context effect that is particularly relevant to this paper
is background contrasts, which occur when previously
faced options affect current decisions. Simonson and Tversky (1992) first documented this effect in an experiment
where subjects made sets of two choices, the first being the
experimental treatment. The manipulation consisted in having half the subjects make a choice between two options that
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had an implicit high cost for an attribute, and the other half
making a choice with an implicit low cost for the same
attribute. The second choice was the same for all subjects.
Consistent with the authors’ hypothesis, subjects who were
in the high-cost treatment were more likely to choose the
expensive option in the second choice.
Contrast effects have also been found in nonhuman animals. Waite (2001) designed a study similar to that of
Simonson and Tversky, using gray jays as subjects. All birds
in the experiment had a choice of obtaining one raisin with
low effort or three raisins with high effort. As in Simonson
and Tversky (1992), half the subjects faced first an expensive choice (where the three raisins required much more
effort than just one) and half a cheap choice (where three
were just as hard to obtain as one). Consistent with a
background contrast effect, birds that had experienced the
expensive background were more likely to pursue the three
raisins in the second stage than those who had experienced
the cheap one. More recently, in a closely related project,
George Loewenstein and I show that the amount of money
people spend on rent in a city they have just moved to is
influenced by how expensive housing is in the city they
came from (Simonsohn & Loewenstein, 2006).
III.

C i,t ⫽ ␤ 0 ⫹ ␤ 1 X i,t ⫹ ␤ 2 C i,t⫺1 ,

This paper studies background contrasts by examining
how average commutes in cities where people have lived in
the past affect commuting decisions after individuals have
moved to a new city. Note that unlike habit formation
models, contrast effects occur when previously observed
options, rather than previous choices, affect current decisions.
A standard utility model can easily be modified to incorporate background contrasts by treating previously observed
options as complementary (that is, marginal-utilityenhancing) with current consumption. This approach is
commonly used to model external influences on preferences
(see for example, Laibson, 2001; Becker & Murphy, 1988,
1993; and Stigler & Becker, 1977).
In particular, let the utility function be Ut ⫽ U(It, Ct; Ct*),
where It is the consumption in period t, Ct is the commuting
time in period t, and C*t represents the background used to
assess current tradeoffs, corresponding in this case to previously observed commutes. C*t is indexed by time because
the background an individual uses to judge options is
proposed to be updated as new budget constraints for
commuting are encountered.
Background contrasts imply that the marginal rate of
substitution between commuting and consumption increases
after having experienced a high background, and hence we
can characterize the chosen commute length at period t by
individual i with the following reduced-form equation:
(1)

(1⬘)

leading to
Prediction 1. The average commute length in the city a
mover comes from has a positive effect on the chosen
commute in the new city.
As the mover remains in the new city, however, the
background used for judging commuting options (C*) will
converge toward the new local reality, leading in turn to a
change in the desired commute length. To assess the effect
of this adjustment we subtract equation (1) evaluated at
period t from it evaluated at period t⫹1, obtaining
⌬C i,t⫹1 ⫽ ␤ 1 ⌬X i,t⫹1 ⫹ ␤ 2 共C *i,t⫹1 ⫺ C *i,t 兲.

(2)

Using again C i,k to represent the average commute in the
city where person i lives in period k, and assuming that after
living in the new city for a year people fully adjust to their
new background (that is, that C*i,t⫹1⫽C i,t), we get
⌬C i,t⫹1 ⫽ ␤ 1 ⌬X i,t⫹1 ⫹ ␤ 2 共 C i,t ⫺ C i,t⫺1 兲,

Background Contrasts and Commuting

C i,t ⫽ ␤ 0 ⫹ ␤ 1 X i,t ⫹ ␤ 2 C *i,t ,

where Xi,t are the relevant characteristics of individual i in
time period t. Because C*i,t is not observable, we must use a
proxy to estimate equation (1). In particular, we use average
commute in the city where a mover came from (C i,t⫺1),

(2⬘)

leading to
Prediction 2. As people stay in their new city, they will
readjust their commute, countering the effect their previous
city had on their initial choice.
The intuition behind prediction 2 is the following: a
person who moves from New York to Pittsburgh, say, may
initially choose to live 35 minutes away from work (well
above the average commute in Pittsburgh). As he stays in
Pittsburgh, however, the 35-minute trip will be evaluated as
too long, eventually leading him to move closer to work.
Because prediction 2 deals with changes in behavior, all
stable differences across individuals are controlled for; if
people who come from cities with higher C i,t⫺1 commute
more in period t because they are (in some unobserved way)
different from those coming from lower C i,t⫺1, we would not
expect them to systematically revise their commutes as they
stay in their destination cities. This second prediction will
hence be useful in ruling out alternative explanations, particularly those relying on stable unobserved differences
across movers from different cities.
Equations (1⬘) and (2⬘) highlight that for movers between
cities there are two sources of variation in C*. One comes
from differences in previously observed commutes among
individuals arriving from different cities in period t; the
second comes from the updating of C* within individuals as
they remain in the new city. Each of these two sources of
variation in C* leads to a specific prediction, both derived
from the hypothesis that, in equation (1), ␤2⬎0. The data
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TABLE 1.—COMPARISON

OF

REASONS

FOR

MOVING BETWEEN CITIES

AND

3

WITHIN CITIES

Reason for Moving

(1) Between
Different Cities

(2) Within
Same City

Job-related
Live closer to work
Housing-related (increase)
Housing-related (decrease)
Become owner or got married
Neighborhood, or closer to family or friends
Outside events (evicted, divorce, job transfer)
Mixed reasons
Don’t know or refuse to answer
Total

36.0%
9.9%
10.9%
5.5%
10.5%
3.9%
12.8%
8.2%
2.4%
100.0%

6.8%
14.6%
18.2%
8.1%
21.8%
3.8%
13.2%
10.1%
3.6%
100.0%

then lend themselves to estimating ␤2 through two independent regressions. As we shall see, the two methods lead to
similar estimates of ␤2.
IV.

Empirical Analysis

A. Source of the Data

To study the influence of city-level conditions on individual decisions, it is necessary to combine individual and
aggregate data. For the former, the PSID is ideal. It includes
yearly data on a wide variety of economic decisions made
by individuals, including city of residence and the length of
their commute to work (in both distance and time).1
Although the analysis of interest deals with the behavior
of movers between cities, the empirical analysis could be
conducted using all households in the PSID, adding the
relevant slope dummies for households that relocated to
new cities; alternatively the analysis could be conducted
exclusively on these intercity movers. Table 1 reports the
distribution of answers to the question “Why did you
move?” for both types of movers. Between- and within-city
movers report significantly different motives for having
moved, suggesting their moving decision should be analyzed separately. The analysis, therefore is conducted only
on movers between cities, excluding people who did not
move or who moved within a city.
The PSID collected data on commuting until 1986. The
individual-level data, then, consist of PSID households that
moved between two different MSAs in the 1972-to-1986
period.2 Observations where commuting time was reported
to be less than 2 minutes or more than 90 (one-way) were
excluded from the analyses.3
1 Some of the data used in the analysis are derived from the Sensitive
Data Files of the PSID, obtained under special contractual arrangements
designed to protect the anonymity of respondents. These data are not
available from the author. Persons interested in obtaining PSID Sensitive
Data Files should contact PSIDHelp@isr.umich.edu.
2 In 1982 the PSID didn’t collect data on commuting time, so that year
is not included in the sample.
3 These corresponded to the 1st and 99th percentiles of observations,
respectively. The fact that many of the respondents reporting commuting
times of less than 2 minutes report distances from work superior to 10
miles, and many of those with commutes longer than 90 minutes report
distances of less than 5 miles, validates the presumption that these
observations correspond to errors.

For the city-level data, the PSID is not an adequate
source, as it contains less than 5 observations for most
MSAs. Instead, I used the Journey-to-Work Supplement of
the 1980 Census.4 In particular, I calculated the average
commute length and proportion of people using different
transportation modes in every metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) in the United States, and then matched these figures
to the PSID using the geographic data file referred to in
footnote 1. For each household, the year prior to the move
is referred to as t⫺1, the year of the move as t, and the year
following it as t⫹1.
B. Data Description

The main reason for focusing on movers between cities is
to observe decisions made by individuals who currently face
commuting options that differ from those they have faced in
the past (that is, individuals who face a contrast between
current and background conditions).
Cities have an average commute (for drivers) of 21
minutes, with a standard deviation—across cities—of 2.9
minutes, or 13.8% of the mean. The average move in the
sample occurred between cities that differ in their average
commute by 13.6%; this figure indicates that cities between
which individuals are moving indeed differ in their commuting conditions.
An important feature of the sample is that the moves
occurred between a wide array of cities (204 origin cities
and 218 destination cities). Of all moves in the sample, 83%
were between a unique origin-destination city pair, and 97%
of them were between city pairs that are repeated a maximum of three times.
C. Empirical Analyses

Testing Prediction 1: According to prediction 1, the
average commute length in the city a mover comes from has
a positive effect on the chosen commute in the new city.
This section presents regression analyses that support this
prediction. Alternative explanations for the findings, includ4 The Journey-to-Work Supplement is available at the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Web site (http://
www.icpsr.umich.edu).

4

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
TABLE 2.—TRAVEL DEMAND REGRESSIONS ESTIMATES
Dependent variable: Ci,t
(1)
Independent variable
Constant
Family income (in $1,000s)
Number of adults in household
Number of children in household
Age of head
Age of head squared
College dummy (1 if attended)
Average commute in destination
Average commute in city of origin

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Baseline

(2)
Adds Avg.
Commute City
of Origin

Adds Year
Fixed Effects

Adds own
commute t⫺1

Adds own
commute t⫺2

Only car
commuters

⫺7.664
(7.703)
0.048
(0.021)
⫺2.009
(1.119)
1.240
(0.578)
0.380
(0.369)
⫺0.002
(0.005)
⫺0.391
(0.972)
1.025
(0.174)

⫺18.889
(8.691)
0.043
(0.021)
⫺1.761
(1.116)
1.187
(0.580)
0.402
(0.363)
⫺0.003
(0.005)
⫺0.417
(0.962)
0.852
(0.174)

⫺19.950
(8.996)
0.038
(0.021)
⫺1.816
(1.125)
1.182
(0.568)
0.380
(0.365)
⫺0.003
(0.005)
⫺0.046
(1.112)
0.825
(0.173)

⫺16.776
(8.733)
0.034
(0.021)
⫺1.512
(1.108)
1.203
(0.566)
0.302
(0.355)
⫺0.002
(0.005)
⫺0.076
(1.086)
0.819
(0.171)

⫺22.971
(9.050)
0.046
(0.024)
⫺0.866
(1.195)
0.835
(0.619)
0.378
(0.394)
⫺0.003
(0.005)
⫺0.698
(1.147)
0.744
(0.192)

⫺9.406
(8.072)
0.051
(0.020)
⫺0.879
(1.019)
1.421
(0.037)
0.176
(0.393)
⫺0.001
(0.005)
⫺0.920
(1.154)
0.603
(0.183)

0.684
(0.179)
—

0.747
(0.181)
—

0.437
(0.183)
0.231
(0.039)

0.512
(0.199)
0.255
(0.049)

0.420
(0.173)
0.166
(0.033)
—

Own commute in city of origin (t⫺1)

—
—
—

Own commute in city of origin (t⫺2)

—

—

—

—

1/(Mills ratio)

—

—

—

—

0.055
(0.040)
—

Year fixed effects

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.023
(3.162)
Yes

0.08
1,067

0.09
1,067

0.10
1,067

0.15
1,067

0.19
841

0.11
918

R-square
Number of observations
Robust standard errors below parameter estimates.

ing unobservable taste differences and imperfect information, are discussed later.
To test prediction 1, the following version of equation
(1⬘) was estimated:
Ci,t ⫽ ␤0 ⫹ ␤1,1 C i,t ⫹ ␤12 Ci,t⫺1 ⫹ Xit ␤1,3 ⫹ ␤2 C i,t⫺1 , (1⬙)
where Xi,t includes the number of adults and children, family
income, age of household head, and a dummy for attending
college. C i,t is included to control for variation in commuting conditions across different cities. Table 2 reports the
estimates for several specifications of equation (1⬙). Column
1 is the baseline specification, column 2 incorporates C i,t⫺1,
column 3 adds yearly fixed effects, column 4 adds Ci,t⫺1,
column 5 adds Ci,t⫺2, and column 6 restricts the analysis to
drivers.
Most of the control variables’ parameter estimates are
hard to interpret, as these variables affect the desired commute length through diverse, often opposing mechanisms.
For example, the number of children in a household may
increase the desired commute length by restricting the
school districts an individual is willing to move to (for
example, a parent that would otherwise commute 10 minutes chooses to live farther from work in order to enjoy a

better school district). On the other hand, children may
increase the opportunity cost of time and hence reduce the
desired commute. Likewise, higher income may increase
the opportunity cost of time (decreasing the desired commute length) but may also be the result of compensatory
wages for longer commutes. Similar reasoning applies to the
number of adults in the household, education, and age; their
estimates, therefore, are not economically meaningful.
Column 2 incorporates the key variable of interest: C i,t⫺1.
Its effect on Ci,t is estimated as positive and significant (p ⬍
0.01). Consistent with prediction 1, individuals coming
from cities with longer average commutes choose to commute significantly longer in their new city than their peers
coming from cities with shorter commutes. In column 3
yearly fixed effects are added to the regression, and they do
not have a significant effect on any of the coefficient
estimates.
Column 4 includes the individuals’ own commute in the
previous city (Ci,t⫺1) as a control. Previous commuting
choices are likely to be predictive of current choices for
both psychological reasons (for example, by acting as a
reference point) and traditional economic reasons (unobserved heterogeneity is captured by previous choices). It is
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therefore not surprising that Ci,t⫺1 is a significant predictor
of C i,t. What’s interesting is that C i,t⫺1 remains positive and
significant (p ⫽ 0.017) after its inclusion. As we shall see
later, this will be useful for ruling out unobserved heterogeneity as an alternative explanation.
In light of the fact that one single decision may be an
unreliable measure of taste or previous commuting experience, column 5 includes the individual’s commute of the
previous two years as controls. Ci,t⫺1 can be a noisy measure
of taste for two reasons. (i) classical measurement error
(individuals misreport the actual commute length, or the
PSID makes a mistake in recordkeeping), and (ii) individuals may have not been commuting the optimal distance in
the past, so that the actual commute is a noisy measure of
the desired commute. Adding the 2-year lag should reduce
both sources of noise.
If noise in Ci,t⫺1 was the reason why C i,t⫺1 remained
significant after its inclusion, reducing such noise should
take away power from the estimated coefficient of C i,t⫺1. On
the contrary, the point estimate of C i,t⫺1 is slightly strengthened by the inclusion of a cleaner control of previous
choices. Note that because Ci,t⫺1 and Ci,t⫺2 are strongly
correlated (r ⫽ 0.42), their individual significance tests
should be interpreted with caution.
Commuting times are dramatically different for drivers
and users of public transportation (in this sample, 22 and 38
minutes, respectively). It is possible therefore, that the effect
of C i,t⫺1 on Ci,t operates (exclusively) through the chosen
mode of transportation, that is, that the origin city affects
only willingness to use public transportation, and not the
commute length per se. To assess this possibility, column 6
presents the results of estimating equation (3) only on
drivers. The parameter estimate for C i,t⫺1 is still positive and
significant, and of a similar magnitude to the one found for
the whole sample, suggesting that the effect of C* doesn’t
operate exclusively through the chosen mode of transportation. Because this regression was estimated on a restricted
subsample (excluding nondrivers), a two-step Heckman
procedure was employed. The results from the first stage
(not reported) show that individuals who drove in the
previous city, moved to cities with higher proportions of
drivers, or had higher incomes were more likely to drive in
their destination city.5
Testing Prediction 2: According to prediction 2, as
individuals stay in their new city, C* adjusts to local
commuting standards and the desired commute follows suit.
According to prediction 2, then, if an individual has moved
from a long-commute city to a short-commute city (C i,t ⬍
5 The second stage incorporates the Mills ratio, which is a function of
other independent variables. In order for this stage to be identified beyond
nonlinearities, it is necessary for the first stage to include variables which
are excluded in the second stage. This is clearly the case here, where
almost all variables from the first stage are excluded from the second.

5

C i,t⫺1), the individual will initially commute too much and
will choose a shorter commute in the future (Ci,t⫹1 ⬍Ci,t).
Because prediction 2 deals with changes in behavior, all
stable differences across individuals are controlled for: if
people who come from cities with higher C i,t⫺1 commute
more in period t because they are (in some unobserved way)
different from those coming from lower C i,t⫺1, we would not
expect them to systematically revise their commutes as they
stay in their destination cities. If, on the other hand, they are
only temporarily affected by a contrast between current and
past realities, once this contrast fades away, so should its
effect on desired commute.
To test prediction 2, a regression was estimated with
adjustment of commuting time between t and t ⫹ 1 as the
dependent variable, and difference in average commuting
time between current and previous city as the key predictor.
This regression corresponds to equation (2⬘) in the previous
section. Recall that the ␤2 that measures the influence of the
difference in average commutes between cities in equation
(2⬘) is the same ␤2 estimated for equation (1⬙).
We must restrict the analysis to people who move again
within a year of arriving at the new city, because only for
them is the change in desired commute length observable.
The results are presented in Table 3.6
Column 1 shows the results without any covariates,
column 2 adds changes in observables (income, number of
adults in the household, and number of children), and
column 3 presents the results of a two-stage Heckman
procedure controlling for the potential selection bias arising
from conducting the analysis on the subsample of people
who moved again (first stage not reported).
As predicted, ␤2 is estimated as positive and significant:
as movers stay in their new city, they systematically readjust
their commuting length, countering the initial effect that the
previous city had on their choice in the new city. The point
estimate of ␤2 (around 0.63) is similar to the estimate of ␤2
obtained in the testing of prediction 1. This suggests that
after a year in the new city, those that move again completely reverse the initial effect that their previous city had
on how far they live from work.7
D. Alternative Explanations

The previous subsections show evidence consistent with
predictions 1 and 2: the longer the average commute in the
city of origin, the longer the commute a newly arrived
individual chooses in the destination city; but as she stays in
the new city and moves again, her commute is revised,
countering the initial effect of previously observed com6 If the regression is estimated using the whole sample, the qualitative
nature of the results does not change. The point estimate is reduced,
however, as a result of incorporating many observations where instead of
the change in desired commute length we observe a 0. The coefficient is
still significant at the 5% level.
7 Indeed, if equation (1⬙) is estimated using the subsample of re-movers
and with commute in t ⫹ 1 as the dependent variable, C i,t⫺1 is no longer
a significant predictor.
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TABLE 3.—ADJUSTMENT

OF

COMMUTE LENGTH

IN

t⫹1

Dependent variable: ⌬Ci,t⫹1 ⫽ Ci,t⫹1 ⫺ Ci,t
Independent Variable
Intercept
C i,t ⫺ C i,t ⫺ 1
Change in family income
Change in number of adults
Change in number of children
R-square
Number of observations

(1)
Baseline

(2)
Adds Controls

(3)
2-Stage Heckman

⫺0.502
(0.722)

⫺0.519
(0.750)

0.733
(41.40)

0.631
(0.188)

0.627
(0.189)

0.627
(0.201)

—
—
—
—
—
—

⫺0.019
(0.027)
1.663
(2.017)
⫺0.268
(1.810)

⫺0.019
(0.028)
1.499
(5.89)
⫺0.220
(2.29)

0.03
340

0.03
340

0.03
340

Robust standard errors below parameter estimates.

mutes. These two findings are consistent with the notion of
contrast effects, but they may also be consistent with other
explanations. In this subsection three specific alternative
explanations are discussed: habit formation, self-selection
into cities, and imperfect information.
Stable Taste Differences: In the presence of habit formation, past consumption increase the marginal utility of
future consumption. If people’s tolerance for commuting
increases with “consumption” of long commutes, then movers coming from cities with higher C i,t⫺1 might choose
longer commutes in the new city because they have commuted more (on average) in the past, and have developed a
habit of it (they have accumulated more commuting capital).8
A self-selection-based explanation reverses causality between taste and past behavior: if people incorporated commuting considerations in their choice of what city to live in,
those who dislike commuting the least would be more likely
to have lived in cities with longer commutes. Movers from
cities with higher C i,t⫺1 would commute more in the new
city, not because they use the past as a yardstick to assess
the present, but rather, because they have never been too
much bothered by long commutes.
Because of taste formation and self-selection, then, movers coming from cities with different commuting conditions
may differ in their idiosyncratic taste for commuting. In
what follows I discuss four different approaches to assess
the plausibility of this alternative explanation. All four
suggest that unobserved heterogeneity is not sufficient to
explain the results presented in the previous section.
(i) Inclusion of previous choices. If C i,t⫺1 correlates
with Ci,t because it is proxying for previous commuting
choices, and hence with unobserved taste, then once
8 Similarly, people may have invested in technology that lowers the
disutility of commuting, for example, by purchasing large collections of
books on tapes.

previous choices are directly controlled for, the effect
should be eliminated. Note that, even in the absence of
taste formation or self-selection, the significance of C i,t⫺1
is expected to drop after including Ci,t⫺1, due to collinearity. Finding an effect of Ci,t⫺1 on Ci,t after such inclusion
is hence a conservative test. As was shown earlier,
including Ci,t⫺1 did not eliminate the effect of C i,t⫺1.
Perhaps more importantly, adding Ci,t⫺2 had virtually no
impact on the coefficient of C i,t⫺1, suggesting that the
reason why C i,t⫺1 remains significant is not measurement
error on Ci,t⫺1.
(ii) Excluding observable heterogeneity. Another way to
asses the extent to which the estimated effect of C i,t⫺1 may
be picking up unobserved heterogeneity is to evaluate how
much variation in observed heterogeneity it picks up. Because there is no reason to suspect that the relationship
between C i,t⫺1 and observables is any stronger than that with
unobservables, a substantial change in the estimated coefficient of C i,t⫺1 after omitting all observables would be
worrisome. To do this comparison, table 4 replicates the
regression analysis presented in columns (4) and (5) of table
2, excluding all observable covariates. Comparing the point
estimates for C i,t⫺1 of the two tables, we see that the
exclusion of all covariates has an effect of around 10% on
the point estimates (from 0.437 to 0.468 in one specification
and from 0.512 to 0.573 in the other). Given that omitting
(all) controls for observable heterogeneity wouldn’t dramatically affect the estimate of C i,t⫺1, there is little reason to
suspect that the omission of unobservable heterogeneity is
what is driving the effect.
(iii) Aggregate commutes in t don’t correlate with individual commutes in t⫺1. A sorting story proposes that
individuals who chose to live in cities with long commutes
dislike commuting less than individuals who chose cities
with short commutes. This story would predict that individuals currently living in a city with long commutes do not
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TABLE 4.—COMMUTING REGRESSION EXCLUDING OBSERVABLE HETEROGENEITY
Dependent Variable: Ci,t⫺1
Controlling for
Previous Choice

Controlling for Two
Previous Choices

⫺10.185
(4.813)
0.844
(0.176)

⫺12.759
(4.791)
0.734
(0.189)

Average commute in origin city

0.468
(0.184)

0.573
(0.197)

Own commute in t ⫺ 1
Own commute in t ⫺ 2

0.237
(0.041)
—

0.249
(0.047)
0.083
(0.039)

Number of observations
R-square

1067
0.10

841
0.14

Independent variable
Intercept
Average commute in destination city

Robust standard errors below parameter estimates.

dislike commuting as much as individuals currently living
in cities with short commutes; the relationship between
aggregate and individual behavior, therefore, should also be
found working backward in time (that is, people currently
living in cities with long commutes should have commuted
longer—ceteris paribus—in their origin city).
If, on the other hand, average commutes in the previous
city have a causal effect on the present, as proposed in this
paper, then C i,t should not be correlated with Ci,t⫺1, because
individuals choosing their commute in t⫺1 were not affected by the yet unseen background of commutes in their
TABLE 5.—CITY-LEVEL COMMUTES

IN

destination city. Table 5 reports the results of conducting
this reversed regression. The dependent variable is the
individual commute in the t⫺1, and the key predictor is the
average commute in the destination city. The results show
no association between average commutes in the destination
city and individual-level commutes in the origin city, obtaining point estimates close to 0 and p-values far from
standard significance levels (p ⬎ 0.9 in column 1, and p ⬎
0.3 in column 2).
(iv) Stable differences are inconsistent with prediction 2.
Finally, if people arriving from different cities have stable

t DO NOT CORRELATE

WITH INDIVIDUAL

BEHAVIOR

IN

t⫺1

Dependent Variable: Ci,t⫺1
(1)
Baseline

(2)
Adds own commute in
destination city

⫺17.956
(7.215)
0.003
(0.017)
1.310
(0.989)
0.035
(0.392)
0.289
(0.288)
⫺0.002
(0.004)
1.301
(0.957)

⫺14.304
(6.920)
⫺0.006
(0.017)
1.993
(0.975)
⫺0.229
(0.392)
0.188
(0.281)
⫺0.001
(0.004)
1.402
(0.934)

Average commute in destination city (t)

0.013
(0.169)

⫺0.163
(0.170)

Average commute in city of origin (t ⫺ 1)

1.410
(0.159)
—
—

1.274
(0.153)
0.206
0.036

Independent Variable
Constant
Family income (in $1,000s)
Number of adults in household
Number of children in household
Age of head
Age of head squared
College dummy (1 if attended)

Own commute in destination city (t)
R-square
Number of observations
Robust standard errors below parameter estimates.

8.93%
1,067

13.16%
1,067

8

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

taste differences that lead them to commute differently in
their new city, then they should continue to make different
choices in the future. If, on the other hand, their differences
are short-lived and caused simply by the different backgrounds they have experienced, their behavior should coverage once they all share the same background.
The evidence presented earlier supporting prediction 2,
therefore, is inconsistent with an explanation based on
stable taste differences.
In sum, all four approaches fail to find evidence consistent with the notion that unobserved heterogeneity in taste,
correlated with city of origin, may be behind the effect.
Imperfect Information: Imperfect information by itself
would not lead to the reported effect of city of origin on
commute length; if people have noisy estimates of what the
commute tradeoffs are in their new city, they should choose
suboptimally, but not systematically so.
Imperfect information plus a few auxiliary assumptions,
however, could account for the reported pattern. For example, if one assumes that movers (1) are unaware of the
commuting conditions in the new city, (2) organize their
house (or job) search by distance from work (or home), and
(3) have a stopping rule (that is, a reservation distance they
are willing to travel), then movers from cities with shorter
commutes would end up living closer to work because their
stopping rule would be triggered earlier.
Such a process is in fact very similar to the interpretation
of the data proposed in this paper, where the same objective
commute is perceived differently (above or below the stopping rule) based on how long commutes have been in the
past. Why would movers from a city with long commutes
settle for a neighborhood that’s farther from work and
discontinue the search earlier than people moving from a
city with short commutes? Perhaps precisely because their
perception of a reasonable commute is affected by their
experience.
Regardless of the specific auxiliary assumptions, an
imperfect-information-based explanation is problematic.
Because of the importance of the decision and the low
cost of the information involved, it seems implausible to
suggest that optimally obtained information may be driving the effect. If households search for information optimally, they should do so until the expected payoff of the
information is equal to its cost. Information about commuting is very cheap—arguably almost unavoidably acquired by movers as they are looking for homes (or jobs)
and as they travel around their new city—whereas the
benefits of choosing the appropriate commute are sizable.9 Note that I am not suggesting that newcomers will
9 With back-of-the-envelope calculations we can ballpark the effect size
of C* at around $145 a year: The estimated coefficient of C i,t is 0.6. The
standard deviation of C i,t is 2.9 minutes. With 10 trips per week and 50
weeks a year at a value of $10 an hour we get [0.6 ⫻ (2.9 ⫻ 10)/60] ⫻
50 ⫻ $10 ⫽ $145.

have perfect information about commuting options in
their new city, but only that they should be able to make
unbiased estimates of the typical commute length.
V.

Conclusions

This paper documents that the average commute in the
city movers came from has a positive influence on the commute they choose in the new city, consistent with the notion
of contrast effects. As these movers stay in their new cities
and make new commuting decisions, they counter the initial
influence of their origin, again consistent with contrast
effects, but not with alternative explanations that rely on
imperfect information, habit formation, or selection into
cities based on stable taste.
The notion that preferences are affected by previous
consumption is by now widely accepted in economics.
This paper suggests that, in addition, people behave as if
previously observed options also influenced their current
marginal utility. This effect appears to be short-lived,
probably because new options replace previous ones in
their role as background against which options are evaluated.
These findings have potentially important implications
for empirical investigations of preferences. Applied economists from various fields use observed behavior to infer
preferences in an array of different domains, such as wage
differentials in labor economics, hedonic prices in housing
economics, and travel costs in environmental economics,
among many others. The validity of such studies relies on
the assumption that the preferences that are revealed for the
goods and services the researchers are studying are stable.
If, as the results from this paper suggest, preferences are
affected by the options they have encountered, future empirical work should strive to identify them and include them
in the analysis, particularly if they are conducting the study
in order to assess the impact of a specific policy change that
may change the very conditions that are currently affecting
preferences.
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